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Abstract 
Euro 2012 was the first Sport Mega Event held in Poland. It has been 
presented in public discourse in Poland as unprecedented opportunity for 
modernization and unquestionable success. However, looking at a multitude 
of data concerning the political, economic and social consequences of the 
event, allows putting these opinions into question. The paper discusses these 
topics using the numbers and information from various resources, considering 
also uncritical support of political circles and mainstream media for the idea 
of hosting Euro 2012, as well as lack of critical scrutiny of academic circles 
into the real costs of the event. 
Key words: Sport Mega Events, Euro 2012, Polish politics and economy, 
football, civic rights. 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most influential contemporary thinkers, the late Tony Judt, in his 
monumental “Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945” analyzed the impact of 
football on the project of a joint Europe, particularly the creation of pan-European 
club competition in the fifties, which crossed the division marked by the “iron 
curtain”. Elaborating on the unprecedented role of this Europeanization of football 
competition, which created a common sphere for both institutions (associations, 
clubs, football-related enterprises) and the masses (supporters and spectators), he 
concluded: What really united Europe is football [2005: 782]. Undoubtedly, the 
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role of sport went beyond the borders of just competition and spectatorship. As 
a cultural, anthropological, and sociological phenomenon influencing politics and 
economics it has been studied from the whole range of perspectives employed 
by social scientists. 
One of the most prominent contemporary manifestations of the multidi-
mensional and global impact of sport refers to the so-called Sport Mega Events 
(hereafter: SMEs), which are truly global events with the sport competition at 
the centre of their rationale [Roche 2000]. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenre-
iter underline that two central features of contemporary mega-events are firstly, 
that they are deemed to have significant consequences for the host city, region 
or nation in which they occur, and secondly, that they will attract considerable 
media coverage. What also defines certain sport events as ‘mega’ is that they are 
‘discontinuous’, i.e. out of the ordinary, international, and simply very large in 
composition [2006: 2, see also: Whitson, Horne 2006]. 
Furthermore, Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser claim that: [i]n recent 
times, sport mega events have grown into major global spectacles that possess 
huge economic, political and social significance. Cities and nations compete in-
tensively for the right to host mega events such as the Olympic Games, the Super 
Bowl in American football, the Champions League final in European football or 
the ‘World Cup finals’ of various sports. For the organisers, these events are seen 
as conferring high levels of national and international prestige on host cities, as 
well as a variety of other benefits such as urban regeneration, increased tourism 
and new partnerships with global corporations [2011: 3157]. 
The UEFA European Football Championships are organized every four years 
in one or two countries, traditionally from the old continent. Since 1996, as many 
as 16 best national teams compete in one of the most prestigious sport challenges. 
Even though restricted to the participants from one continent, the tournaments 
are truly global events in terms of magnitude. Hence, they are perceived as the 
third largest SME after the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup tournaments 
[see: Klauser 2011: 4; Gratton, Shibli, Coleman 2006: 41]. 
Contrary to the lack of interest among the academic sociological community 
in Poland, the issues regarding SMEs are approached and vibrantly debated from 
various perspectives in the international scientific discourse. The most convincing 
examples can be found in Periodicals, not just those specializing in social stud-
ies of sport. Within last six years a number of Periodicals have devoted special 
volumes to SME matters, namely: Sociological Review (2006, vol. 54, issue 
supplement 2), Soccer & Society (2010, vol. 11, no 6), International Review 
for Sociology of Sport (vol. 47, no 3) Global Networks (2007, vol. 7, issue 2), 
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Urban Studies (2011, vol. 48, no 15), British Journal of Sociology (2012, vol. 63, 
issue 2), Environment and Planning (2012, virtual issue: Sport Mega Events and 
the city), and the International Journal of Cultural Policy (2008, vol. 14, no 4).
This paper aims at presenting the most crucial contexts in which SMEs 
are analyzed in international academic debate and proving the need for 
critical research on the legacy of the European Football Championships 
held in Poland (and in Ukraine) in 2012 (hereafter Euro 2012). For this rea-
son, a preliminary analysis of some publicly available data is undertaken. 
The article is descriptive and rather idiographic. It points out some contexts of 
SMEs which should be approached by independent researchers and are particularly 
important in those situations where most of the elaborations concerning the real 
outcomes of the event are commissioned by political bodies. Critical scrutiny is 
also required because the other bodies which could provide independent evalu-
ation (mainstream media, opposition political parties) were, in the case of Euro 
2012, unanimous in supporting the idea of hosting the tournament, presenting it 
as extraordinary opportunity for further modernization of Poland. 
SPORT MEGA EVENTS IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC  
AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS
What allures governments and cities to the idea of hosting SMEs? Undoubtedly, 
apart from the event itself it is the number of legacies that they promise: For the 
organisers, these events are seen as conferring high levels of national and inter-
national prestige on host cities, as well as a variety of other benefits such as urban 
regeneration, increased tourism and new partnerships with global corporations 
[Giulianotti, Klauser 2011: 3157]. This goes in line with catchy paraphrase of the 
famous Carl von Clausewitz’s quote: Sport is the continuation of politics by other 
means, offered by Xin Xu, who analyzed the role of the Olympic Games held in 
Beijing for Chinese politics during the past decade [Xu 2006: 91]. 
For some countries –  the most notable case being the Republic of South Africa 
– hosting an SME became one of the major strategies of both internal and foreign 
policies. Since achieving both sport and political success during the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup, the South African government has participated in several bids to host 
other recognized tournaments. Despite unsuccessful campaigns for organization 
of the 2004 Olympic Games in Cape Town and the 2006 FIFA World Cup in 
football, RSA finally succeeded in its bid to organize the FIFA World Cup four 
years later. This experience was treated both as a way to promote the re-united 
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country all over the world, creating a new image of the post-apartheid democracy, 
and as a way of modernizing its infrastructure [Alegi, 2008, Cornelissen, Swart 
2006, Cornelissen 2012]. This is just one example of the motivations behind the 
political rationale justifying participation in a bidding race to host a SME. 
There are another sporting, social, political and economic attractions about 
SMEs that draw the attention of elites, yet as Horne and Manzenreiter [2006: 9] 
claim, the latter are the main motives behind the public involvement. However, 
in summarizing their review of a large body of literature in the field of SME 
legacies, these authors conclude that: [a]t the same time it seems evident that 
forecasts of the benefits are nearly always wrong.
Evangelia Kasimati, who has analysed all the studies on the economic impacts of 
Olympic Games between 1984 and 2004, notes that all of them were based on rough 
estimations rather than actual data and, consequently, were generally commissioned 
by the proponents of the events [2003: 42–43]. Both Kasimati and Andrew Zim-
balist, probably the most prominent academics in the field of sport economy, note 
that the economic impacts of SMEs tend to be overestimated. They point to a lack 
of attention paid in advance of the games to the supply-side constraints, namely 
crowding-out effects, price increases, displacement of tourists, substitution effects, 
estimations which lump all spending in the course of event as being associated 
with it, or the exaggerated scale of multiplier effects. For instance, research on the 
tourist effects of the 2002 FIFA World Cup in football hosted by South Korea and 
Japan shows that the increase in the number of tourists from Europe was offset by 
the decrease of almost exactly the same number of visitors from Asian countries. 
The total number of foreign visitors to South Korea throughout the tournament 
was estimated at 460 thousand, a figure identical to the number of foreign tourists 
during the same period in the previous year [Matheson, Baade 2004a: 1090–1091; 
see also: Matheson, Baade 2004b, Lee, Taylor 2005].
John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist formulated a very definite conclusion in 
this respect: Most empirical inquiries in economics generate ambiguous findings. 
In stark contrast, independent studies of the economic impact of sports stadiums 
and arenas uniformly detect no statistically significant positive relationship 
between sports facility construction and economic development. These results 
directly contradict the promotional studies that are typically done by consulting 
firms under hire by teams or local supporters of facility construction. (...) Yet 
there is virtually no evidence of any perceptible economic development benefits 
from sports teams or stadiums [Siegfried, Zimbalist 2006: 421–422, see also: 
Noll, Zimbalist 1997]. 
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Even in the case of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, which is often 
presented as the most exemplary success story (dubbed the “Barcelona effect”) 
there are “shadows of the victory”, mainly concerning the rapid increase in prices 
and gentrification of certain city areas [Munoz 2006]. 
The alleged significant economic benefit for local businesses from hosting 
SMEs is also frequently questioned. Due to the fact that main UEFA sponsors 
held special guaranteed privileges in terms of supplying products for trade dur-
ing the event as well as the display of their brands, the promised revenues are 
significantly limited for local entrepreneurs, thus limiting their participation in the 
economic profits [see: Hall 2006]. In fact the economic interplay during SMEs 
has little to do with free competition, as a large number of local economic actors 
are structurally excluded from the market due to the privileges available only to 
the main UEFA partners. 
There are several main themes which are frequently analysed in reference to 
the social costs of hosting SMEs. Most of them refer to their commercial char-
acter, which can lead to serious consequences for the local population. There are 
well researched examples of the commodification, segregation and privatiza-
tion of previously public space in the cities organizing a SME [Klauser 2011a, 
2011b, 2008]. Paradoxically, the pro-market discourse of entrepreneurialism and 
competitiveness is quite frequently in striking contrast with the semi- or openly 
monopolistic practices of the main partners of the UEFA. Potential benefits for 
businesses and the general public in host-cities may be overshadowed by the 
negative consequences of giving global players privileged inroads into local 
markets. The side effects of new investments lead, for example, to gentrification, 
causing massive increases in the cost of living in certain areas [Hall 2006, Munoz 
2006]. These kinds of contradictions are quite typical of neoliberal discourse. In 
the first place, free competition in fact leads quite frequently to the dominance 
of global economic actors and the demise of local entrepreneurships. Secondly, 
the benefits of hosting a SME, which supposedly ‘trickle down’ to the general 
public, usually remain at the disposal of the key economic players involved in 
the preparation of the events. What’s more, the citizens inhabiting areas under 
the multidimensional influence of a SME are not perceived as important social 
actors, as this role is usually ascribed to the visitors-consumers who frequent the 
purposely-designed spaces in the cities. 
Therefore, the expectations for community development or some massive 
advantages with respect to the social fibre of communities usually remain un-
fulfilled, and the outcomes could prove contrary: [T]here are well researched 
examples proving that the ‘state of emergency’ leads to suspension of certain legal 
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provisions, even those treated previously as priorities referring to the security of 
citizens or ecological consequences of public investments [Hall 2006: 64]. This 
observation refers in the first instance to security and surveillance measures, 
which are embedded in a wider context of providing safety during a SME. The 
“state of exception” is deemed to call for exceptional measures. The discourse 
of ‘terrorist threats’ that always accompanies mass gatherings paves the way for 
acceptance of a growing number of actions which limit privacy, increase means 
of social control, allow for privatization of security systems, and lead to an in-
crease in costs which exceeds the capabilities of local authorities, together with 
generally affecting civil rights. As Klauser points out [2011: 1]: [H]ost cities of 
sport mega-events powerfully exemplify the splintering of the contemporary urban 
environment into a wide range of more or less hermetically enclosed and tightly 
controlled enclaves that are supported by advanced surveillance technologies 
and increased numbers of security personnel.
Another issue refers to the earlier-mentioned opportunity costs, which concern 
the potentially more effective uses of public money which is finally spent on 
SME preparations. Both at the national as well as local level these subjects need 
thorough investigation. Yu, Klauser and Chan, summarizing state of the art in 
the field, claim that: First, a growing body of research has in recent years sought 
to investigate the problems and opportunities associated with the organization 
and staging of SMEs. In this field, two types of studies can be distinguished: one 
tends to be focused on the economic value of SMEs in terms of ‘urban entre-
preneurialism’, promoting cities’ and nations’ tourist image, facilitating urban 
transformations, attracting financial investments and thus producing economic 
developments. The other genre tends to be more interpretative and qualitative, 
referring to the ‘sociology and politics of mega-events’ [2009: 391]. 
One of the most important reasons independent research is particularly needed 
in the field concerns the lack of other control in the process of commissioning, 
planning, developing and evaluating the outcomes of these large investments. 
Fundamental research into the management and outcomes of so-called ‘megapro-
jects’ (publicly financed infrastructural investments, including sports stadiums 
and events) was conducted by the multidisciplinary team headed by Flyvbjerg 
[Flyvbjerg et al. 2003: 11–21 and 32–48]. Nevertheless the authors urged great 
caution in approaching the collected data, they went so far as to suggest that 
promoters of large public expenses may often consistently, systematically and 
self-servingly mislead governments and the public in order to get projects ap-
proved. Flyvbjerg also underscores that estimation of the real costs of megapro-
jects is very difficult to assess. The proponents are not interested in a thorough 
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and independent analysis, which could prove their incompetence and even false 
statements. Very rarely is  any kind of funding subject to ex-post evaluation and 
verification of the previous statements. This could be exemplified, for instance, 
in the case of the IMPACT report, i.e. the study commissioned by PL.2012 
(the special purpose entity of the Polish Ministry of Sport and Tourism created 
to organize Euro 2012). This report was hailed as the only scientific and reliable 
assessment of the impact of Euro 2012 on the Polish economy [Borowski 2010]. 
In the table entitled: “Impact of selected international sport events organized in 
the years 2000–2012 on the GDP of hosting countries”, the authors utilize (in 
7 out of 9 cases) data from ex-ante predictions of impacts rather than the actual 
ex-post analysis of the real outcomes of the events [Borowski 2010: 33]. In other 
words, the predicted costs are not verified using the actual figures. 
EURO 2012 IN POLAND AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC  
AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS
1. Politics
The Euro 2012, organized in Poland and Ukraine in the year 2012 (hereafter: 
Euro 2012) is unique in at least two aspects.1 Firstly, it is the First large SMEs 
organized in Europe during the economic and social turmoil caused by the credit 
crunch and financial crisis. While the previous SME tournament was held in 2008 
in Austria and Switzerland in the course of subprime mortgage banking crisis, it 
was held a few weeks before the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 
events which paved the way for the forthcoming global financial meltdown. Bear-
ing this fact in mind, there is undoubtedly a need for the permanent monitoring of 
both the social and economic consequences, as well as symbolic meaning, of this 
SME (Euro 2012) in the changing and uncertain situation of a global and Euro-
pean economic crisis. Secondly, for the first time ever an event of this scale was 
awarded to a country which was undergoing rapid political, economic and social 
transition from an authoritarian state and centrally planned economy to capitalism 
and democracy. 
Even for such a time-specific event, its overarching consequences began 
years before the first game was played. Marek Belka, who served as Polish Prime 
Minister when the bid to host the tournament was submitted, recalls that no one 
1 The topic of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the Ukrainian participation in the whole event 
undoubtedly deserves wide study, but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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believed there was any chance for it to win the competition over the proposal 
from Italy and/or the joint application by Hungary and Croatia. He admitted that 
the Minister of Finance, Mirosław Gronicki, had agreed to sign the financial 
guarantees after being convinced that it was impossible for Poland to be granted 
the tournament, as the country was participating in a bid of this nature for the 
very first time (Polskie Radio 2012a). Tax holidays for UEFA were among the 
privileges guaranteed by the governmental declarations, hence the main organizer 
and beneficiary of the competition did not pay any share of their massive income 
as a tribute to the state, which covered all the costs of hosting the tournament 
[Skwirowski 2012a]. 
Winning the rights to host the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship 
came as a surprise to many and created a new momentum in Polish domestic 
politics.2 Perceived as an unequivocal success by all political parties, in both the 
political and media rhetoric it became another challenge for the country, follow-
ing its fulfilment of its two main goals of the first 15 years of Poland’s transition 
period, i.e. joining NATO and the EU. This could be exemplified by the fact that 
special legislation, allowing for exceptional legal solutions because of hosting 
Euro 2012, was submitted by the government on 3 of September 2007 and very 
quickly approved by the parliament, already on 7 September, 2007, then almost 
immediately (on 19 September 2007) signed by the President of Poland. There 
were 412 votes in support of the legislation and just 2 abstentions, proving the 
unprecedented unanimity  existing between the bitterly conflicted political par-
ties [Krawczyk 2011: 30]. Polish politicians were unequivocally acquiescent in 
accepting the rules imposed by UEFA and its commercial partners. Even right-
wing politicians voted in favour of the law, which limits Polish sovereignty in 
certain areas, granting an external political actor (UEFA) an exceptional status. 
The issue of withdrawal from certain of its prerogatives and creating exceptional 
conditions for the UEFA did not raise any public concerns. Since the UEFA’s 
creation in 1954 as a non-profit umbrella organization for autonomous European 
football associations, it has been transformed into supranational body with pow-
erful financial resources. The income from just the organization of UEFA 2008 
in Austria and Switzerland was estimated at €1,300 million [Włoch 2013: 98; 
Włoch provides a critical and precise analysis of the interrelationship between the 
2 It should be noted that the popular support and public appreciation for the hosting of EURO 2012 
was at its highest in 2007, immediately after the decision of UEFA. However, even at this time in never 
exceeded two thirds of the studied representative sample. In a forthcoming years it began to decrease, 
and two months before the kick-off of the tournament only 44 percent of Poles surveyed said that they 
are “happy” or “rather happy” that Poland would be hosting the tournament [CBOS 2012: 4].  
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Polish state and the UEFA, treated as a global political actor]. At the same time, 
UEFA is one of those supranational bodies which is outside any kind of demo-
cratic control, together with its affiliated national football associations. Poland 
witnessed a several cases of conflict between the government and UEFA, and 
all of them were lost by the Polish side. Several ministers of sport with various 
political affiliations attempted to intervene in the Polish Football Association in 
the course of numerous corruption scandals. All of their actions were blocked by 
the UEFA, which refused to allow any interference in the governance of football 
from democratically chosen and controlled bodies. Threats to expel the Polish 
national team and clubs from any international competition supervised by the 
UEFA and FIFA forced the public institutions to retreat from their attempted 
exercise of control over the way Polish football is managed [see: Woźniak 2013]. 
It also needs to be noted that all the large political parties in Poland were 
involved in either the preparations or organization of the tournament to some 
extent. Thus, politicians from all sides of political spectrum felt partially re-
sponsible for the success of the event.3 This substantially impacted the “checks 
and balances” rule of mutual control by political powers. In addition, the critical 
approach of most mainstream media was aimed more at the way preparations 
of the tournament were carried out (to avoid fiasco and negative reaction from 
European public opinion) than on controlling the costs and consequences of the 
investments undertaken for this purpose. The-editor-in-chief of one of the Pol-
ish weekly magazines, whom I interviewed in connection with another research 
project, admitted that shortly before the kick-off of the Euro 2012, Polish Prime 
Minister Donald Tusk organized a secret meeting with the heads of 40 of Po-
land’s largest mainstream media (radio stations, TV stations, tabloids, broadsheet 
newspapers, weeklies). Asking for support and forbearance, he referred to the 
importance of the forthcoming event for the public image of the Polish state, and 
was met with understanding even from those representatives of journalism usu-
ally declaring full independence from political pressure and praising the media’s 
control functions. ‘Country branding’ was treated, in the course of preparations 
for the tournament, like one of the infinite goals of Polish policy and diplomacy, 
together with the issue of modernization of the country. 
3 This is not a new phenomenon. Marivoet Salome, who analyzed the case of Euro 2004 held 
in Portugal, gives examples from the Portuguese political scene proving how publicly-declared aims 
were changed in the face of problems, and to what extent politicians were conveniently modifying 
their stances in order to sustain their positions as proponents of the great challenges and opportuni-
ties offered created by the SME [2006: 129–130]. 
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Euro 2012 was perceived as an opportunity to modernize the country. There-
fore, the acceleration of investments and growth in spending on roads and other 
infrastructure was unequivocally perceived as the positive fact. Issues concerning 
the quality and/or necessity of the investments were rarely raised. The full ex-post 
analysis of the economic costs of Euro 2012 is not yet possible due to the lack of 
sufficient data (several investments have not been completed), but some of already 
available statistics raise serious doubts, particularly with respect to statements made 
by the political promoters of the event. Institutional analysis of the involvement of 
various public and private actors in the process deserves a thorough and separate 
investigation, together with precise analysis of the discursive practice applied by the 
elites in order to convince the general public to support the great project. Moderni-
zation and its acceleration seems to have served as a particularly effective lever to 
convince otherwise hesitant and critical public opinion, media, and political rivals 
about the necessity to undertake actions in certain spheres or increase spending 
in some of the sectors of the economy.4 The issue of opportunity costs is rarely 
challenged when most of the policy actors and stakeholders share the same view. 
2. Economy
When taking into account the publicly available data, the conclusions must 
be that in many fields the promises made in advance of Euro 2012 were not 
fulfilled. The stands at the newly built stadiums are not filled with new specta-
tors (Ekstraklasa 2013). The average attendance during the games of the highest 
echelon of Polish league decreased in the 2012/2013 season in comparison to 
the two previous seasons. Stadiums built purposely because of Euro 2012 in host 
cities are half empty (in Poznań, the stadium’s capacity is 42 thousand, while 
average attendance is 22.5 thousand; in Wrocław capacity is 44 thousand, average 
attendance is 14.9 thousand and in Gdańsk capacity if 44 thousands and the aver-
age attendance is 13.2 thousand). The case of the National Stadium in Warsaw, 
which is not used for regular games by any sport’s club, is also ambiguous. On 
one hand, the capital city needs the venue for hosting various large scale events 
and the year 2013 was marked by a variety of them. On the other hand, at least in 
4 This is exemplified by the fact that in their official reports the public bodies proudly claim 
that the European supranational governance (in that case the European Investment Bank) exempted 
Poland from the necessity of compliance with legislation relating to environment protection [Borowski 
2010: 47]. Thus, the need to accelerate the investments is used as an excuse to avoid keeping up the 
standards of modern ecological sustainable development. The “state of exception” creating by the 
SME provides perfect justification for creating this kind of loopholes in various spheres.
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several cases the subsidization of private events from public money raises another 
doubts about the way public property is supervised. While the most spectacular 
and widely commented case concerned the Madonna pop concert, which was 
co-financed by the Ministry of Sport and Tourism with 6 million PLN, even 
more public money was spent on locally organized actions. i.e. the costs of the 
concerts by George Michael, Queen, the Polish Masters Football Tournament, the 
Adamek-Klitschko heavyweight boxing match, and friendly game Brazil-Japan, 
all held in Wrocław, amounted to the loss of 15 million PLN by the Municipality of 
Wrocław as co-organizer of these events [Kokot, Karbowiak 2012, Weszło 2012]. 
This data at least is publicly available. The general public will never know 
what amount of money was paid by TVP SA, the Polish public broadcasting sta-
tion financed from taxes, to UEFA, for the Euro 2012 broadcasting rights. Juliusz 
Braun, general director of TVP, admitted that even large revenues from advertis-
ing during the tournament (estimated at 83 million of Euros) and record breaking 
audience figures (more than 16 million during the Poland-Russia game), were not 
sufficient to cover the costs. This seems to support the hypothesis, deeply rooted 
in previous experiences, that Sport Mega Events create a ‘state of emergency’ in 
host countries. Some general rules (e.g. transparency of agreements signed by 
public entities) were questioned by the UEFA, which demanded full secrecy of 
signed contracts [Polskie Radio 2012b]. 
Even some of the infrastructural investments which seemed necessary for 
reasons other than the Euro 2012 turned out to be questionable from the perspec-
tive of ex-post economic analysis. Recent data produced at Technical University 
of Warsaw shows that the train connection between the Warsaw Central Railway 
Station and the Warsaw Airport, completed just before the kick-off of Euro 2012, 
has turned out to be loss-making. Only 3 percent of passengers flying to/from 
Warsaw use this means of transport, and on average just 4 percent of the seats 
on trains are occupied [Osowski 2013]. 
The preliminary evaluation of the tourist movement in 2012 also shows that the 
expectations regarding its impact formulated by the governmental Polish Tourist 
Organization were exaggerated. Occupancy rates were high only during match 
days, and most of the tourists came on one-night stays. The positive evaluations 
of their stays in Poland underscored in media reports do not necessarily translate 
into repeat visits [Borzyszkowski 2012]. It is difficult to verify the data inasmuch 
as the estimations are rough and imprecise. However, already published official 
statistics show that in June 2012 hotel services in Poland were used by 546 thou-
sand foreign tourists during 1.3 million overnight stays. This is only a 17 percent 
increase in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous year (468 
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thousand and 1.1 million respectively) [GUS 2012: 8]. This is reaffirmed by the 
figures showing that the total number of tourists using hotel accommodation in 
June 2012 (including Polish citizens)  decreased by 150 thousand in comparison 
to the corresponding period of the year 2011 [GUS 2013: 2]. This confirms the 
phenomenon of crowding out, observed during other SMEs. The number of 
tourists who come to the country because of the tournament is balanced out by 
the large number of those who resign from visiting during the period the event 
is held. It is also quite meaningful that the number of tourists which visited the 
Polish capital city because of Euro 2012 was lower than the estimated figures of 
tourists which had come there to attend the events organized in 2010 during the 
celebrations of the Chopin Year. This fact was scrupulously used by the Ministry 
of Culture and National Heritage to promote its efforts [2012].
The UEFA and all bodies involved in preparations for the tournament were 
also granted a large number of tax exemptions. The Polish Prime Minister justi-
fied this to the public by referring to the national interest underlying the decision 
to host the tournament. These very general statements were neither accompanied 
by factual arguments nor rooted in any precise analysis of the tax law and the 
financial consequences of the decisions undertaken [Tetłak 2012a, 2012b]. The 
other Polish authorities, when responding to the public inquiries formulated by 
various bodies, felt these superficial and general responses sufficiently explained 
and justified the actions undertaken.
3. Civil rights
A very important context of both the preparations for the SME and the con-
duct of the actual tournament involves the twin issues of human and civil rights, 
particularly with reference to the “state of exception” created by the imposition 
of special legislation. According to the reports of non-governmental bodies 
devoted to human and civil rights, the tournament served as a convenient oc-
casion and justification for increased spending on security and surveillance and 
the tightening of the control measures. More than 900 cameras were installed 
on the National Stadium alone. The purchase of some new devices (for example 
the sonic weapon LRAD – Long Range Acoustic Device) was opposed by these 
non-profit bodies, as it was not accompanied by amendments to the legislation 
which would otherwise not allow Polish military forces to use coercive means 
of this kind. Nevertheless, these devices were witnessed by the observers of civil 
rights organizations, ready to use before some of the “high-risk games”. The costs 
generated by the actions undertaken to secure the event were tremendous and 
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never fully disclosed. Massive police forces were used for this task, along with 
3000 soldiers and advanced military equipment (including F-16 and MIG-29 
fighters and attack helicopters). The Military Gendarmerie also supported the 
police with 1200 soldiers, which means that every second member of this force 
was assigned to secure the SME [Szymielewicz 2012]. 
Paradoxically, the increased monitoring and surveillance was not accompanied 
by strict controls on entering the stadiums during the games. According to the 
official rules of the UEFA, any person holding a valid ticket was allowed to enter 
the stadium and any searches or controls were undertaken in a very superficial 
manner, by the private security company employed by the UEFA (the presence of 
the police inside the stadiums was also very limited due to the rules dictated by 
the UEFA). In this case, the observations of  the NGOs can be confirmed by my 
personal experience. I was allowed to enter the stadium before one of the Euro 
2012 games without the necessity of presenting an ID (although I was required 
to submit a lot of personal data while purchasing the ticket), and neither me nor 
my bag underwent a thorough search, which is standard procedure for Polish 
League games. 
The functioning of the “Law on the security of mass events” was among the 
legal acts that were suspended during the Euro 2012. This referred e.g. to the 
ban on the consumption of alcohol during the events, but also to the treatment 
of spectators. The police officer who was responsible for security issues during 
the Euro 2012 in the Gdańsk voivodship personally admitted to me that the po-
lice force was, during the tournament, supposed to act in accordance with direct 
guidelines from the UEFA and Polish authorities, which required a more forgiv-
able approach to supporters, even in the event of their misbehaviour. Foreign fans 
were supposed to be treated less strictly than Polish citizens, who face harsh and 
sometimes brutal policing typical for handling crowds during ordinary football 
games held in Poland. 
Accordingly to some legal experts, many aspects of the special legal acts 
introduced before the tournament would not stand muster in the Constitutional 
Court, but their short-term nature hampered the lodging of constitutional com-
plaints [Szymielewicz 2012]. However, in several cases Polish courts have judged 
that the laws passed for the sake of organization of the tournament violated 
existing law. For instance, the District Court in Warsaw found that some of the 
rules regulating the purchase of tickets for the Euro 2012 were in violation of the 
Consumer Protection Act. All of them were formulated by UEFA, which granted 
itself the right to avoid any responsibility for the cancellation of an event and the 
right to unilaterally amend the conditions of sales agreements. 
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The issue of the exceptional approach toward human and civil rights is also 
exemplified by the case of Remi Fares, a 23-year old Pole living in the United 
Kingdom who, after successfully passing a multi-stage selection procedure, was 
finally disqualified by the UEFA from the list of volunteers due to the negative 
opinion of the police. The UEFA refused to reveal any justification for its judg-
ment and the decision was declared to be irrevocable. Thus, Fares’ speculation 
that the decision was connected to his Muslim roots (his father is Palestinian) 
can only remain speculation [Rogal, Borusiewicz 2012]. 
CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding above mentioned circumstances, the Euro 2012 was pre-
sented as an unprecedented success during the numerous press conferences held 
by various governmental bodies. Some of the data which was used to confirm 
this success raises serious doubts. For example, one of the economists working 
for the Polish Ministry of Sport and Tourism presented information that Analysis 
conducted by London-based Brand Finance Institute proves that Poland ex-
perienced the highest growth in the value of the national brand – 75 percent. 
Partially it was the effect of the good economic standing of our country, but the 
most significant was the impact of EURO 2012. The lead to the article, which 
was reported in conference, was is straightforward: Thanks to Euro 2012 brand 
value of Poland increased by 75 percent, up to 472 billion of PLN [Skwirowski 
2012b]. In fact, the report of “Brand Institute” [2012] is far more modest in at-
tributing Poland’s success to the Euro 2012, underlining that at the time when data 
was gathered for the purpose of the report, the Euro 2012 was still months from 
kick-off, and stating: Poland has seen the greatest percentage increase in brand 
value in 2012 due largely to the expected long term GDP growth expectations. 
Poland’s economy keeps on growing. Poland is a major exception in the EU – it 
hasn’t been affected by the recession from the time of the first big crisis in 2008 
[Brand Finance 2012: 12]. The only positive influence of Euro 2012 mentioned 
in the report also concerns its allegedly positive impact on the GDP growth. 
Very soon after the tournament, the international consulting company Deloitte 
published a report praising the quality of management provided by the PL.2012 
[2012]. The report was commissioned by the very same special purpose entity 
which was supposed to be evaluated by the auditors. The official website of Pol-
ish Ministry of Sport and Tourism, in an Internet-based publication titled: “The 
Polish effect - the success of Euro 2012 beyond expectations”, presents this report 
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as an independent evaluation. Furthermore, in the very same dispatch, the official 
body of the Polish government presents data from the aforementioned “IMPACT” 
report (which was an ex-ante prediction of the Euro 2012 and its consequences) 
as the actual figures [Ministry of Sport and Tourism 2012].5 The publications, 
which are commissioned by the entities responsible for the event, clearly serve 
PR functions  and marketing purposes rather than constituting a serious and in-
depth analysis of the multidimensional legacy of Euro 2012. 
Analyzing the consequences of a global event of this scale allows Polish 
sociologists to contribute to the international academic debate concerning this 
sphere of social life. So far, they have been absent from ongoing research in this 
field. What’s more, Polish academics were not even vocal in the admittedly not 
very lively public debate during the preparations to Euro 2012.6 
5 The article, even though published in November 2012, claims for instance that Poland may 
be visited because of Euro 2012 by 766 thousand tourists. This greatly exceeds the statistical data 
(at that time already published by the National Statistical Office), showing that throughout the 
whole of June Poland was visited in total by 546 thousand foreign tourists (using hotel services). 
6 It needs to be duly noted that there were two research projects undertaken on the topic of the 
Euro 2012. Since 2008 the research team led by Anna Giza-Poleszczuk tracked the social context 
of the preparations for Euro 2012 (brief versions of the team’s findings are available at: http://
www.ps2012.pl/). Utilizing William Easterly’s concepts of social development, the researchers 
attempted to study presumptive cohesive or inclusive aspects of the Euro 2012. The project could 
be described as action research, as the efforts are both aimed at exploring various processes present 
in a public sphere as well as stimulating public debate, and included some social cooperation in the 
tournament’s host-cities. Another three-year research project financed by the National Centre for 
Culture is carried out by cultural anthropologists Wojciech Burszta and Mariusz Czubaj [2011]. Us-
ing ethnographic methods (in-depth interviewing and participatory observation) the authors attempt 
to track the cultural context of the SME with reference to the  – well-established in anthropological 
studies – frames of carnival time, globalization of the sport, and the potential consequences of the 
Euro 2012 for Polish culture. 
There were a few publications which concerned various aspects of the event, with the paper by 
Kozak [2010] being the most critical, raising doubts and questioning the alleged benefits from the 
hosting of the SME on the basis of previous research. Some of them projected the potential impact 
on local and regional economies by taking as a reference point previous tournaments [Daszkiewicz, 
Wasiluk 2011; Jedel 2012]; others attempted to calculate costs and benefits in purely economic 
terms [Wasilczuk, Zawadzki 2011] or with particular regard to Polish–Ukrainian relations, as in 
the case of  the  book, co-financed by the Polish Football Association and the Social Association 
Poland-Ukraine, co-authored by scholars from Polish and Ukrainian universities [Michałków, 
Kariagin 2011]. Several publications concerned issues of security during the Euro 2012. These 
were co-authored by the representatives of security forces (both public and private) and attempted 
to underscore the hazards of terrorist attacks during the tournament [e.g. Liedel 2007, Urban 2009, 
Kryłowicz et al. 2011, Liedel, Piasecka 2011, Cieślak 2011]. Raising awareness of security risks 
was accompanied by postulates to increase public spending and tighten control in the sphere of 
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Public engagement by sociologists who are not indifferent to what is going 
on in their country and how the issue of public spending is addressed should 
particularly be aware of the aforementioned phenomena, and engage in critical 
scrutiny of the actions of political bodies. This is in accord with the demands 
for publicly-engaged sociology, as formulated by Michael Burawoy, the head of 
International Sociological Association [2009]. Particularly in the era of growing 
commercialization and marketization, accompanied by state retrenchment from 
many of its obligations, it seems essential to control the way scarce public re-
sources are spent. A critical reappraisal of the actions of governments and private 
entities by independent scholars in this field could lead to significant effects. 
It seems that in the last few years a growing number of politicians and policy-
makers all over the world, and in Europe, have become more aware of the am-
biguous impact of SMEs on  national economies, at least to some extent due to 
the growing number of publications provided by sociologists, economists, urban 
scientists, geographers, and lawyers. The results are significant. Owing to the 
lack of interest among potential hosts, the UEFA has decided that the European 
Championships in 2020 will be organized in several countries, in 13 host cities 
(the official justification is that this is designed to celebrate the anniversary of the 
tournament). Some of the richer countries have officially declared that they are 
unwilling to spend money on these kind of enterprises; e.g. the Swedish and Swiss 
governments refused to grant financial guarantees, effectively blocking the initia-
tive aimed at hosting the Winter Olympic Games in 2022. More and more often 
hosting of an SME is granted to non-democratic states (China, Russia, Qatar), 
where public control is limited and the events serve political purposes, as well as 
increasing the income of oligarchic elite circles. In other cases, rich democratic 
countries attempt to use SMEs as a tool to realize some pre-defined goals, fit-
ting them into long-term strategies, for example concerning the revitalization of 
some areas (the cases of Olympic Games in London in 2012 and Tokyo in 2020). 
At the same time, the most prominent Polish politicians have already declared 
their wish to host Winter Olympic Games in 2022 (jointly with Slovakia), justify-
ing it by the unquestioned and unprecedented success of the Euro 2012. An official 
Polish-Slovakian inter-governmental committee for this purpose was formed in 
September 2013, and a bid is supposed to be submitted very soon [Kuraś 2013]. 
security (one of them was titled: “Euro 2012 in a shadow of terrorism”). With the notable exception 
of the paper by Włoch [2013], there are no examples of independent ex-post analysis of Euro 2012 
so far, apart from the regular reports by public statistical offices and bodies. 
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Wojciech Woźniak
WIELKIE IMPREZY SPORTOWE I POTRZEBA  
KRYTYCZNEJ REFLEKSJI SOCJOLOGICZNEJ: PRZYPADEK EURO 2012
Streszczenie
Euro 2012 było pierwszą Wielką Imprezą Sportową zorganizowaną w Polsce. W publicznym 
dyskursie prezentowano ją jako bezprecedensową szansą na modernizację oraz niekwestionowany 
sukces. Jednak, spojrzenie na różnorodne dane dotyczące politycznych, gospodarczy i społecznych 
konsekwencji tego wydarzenia stawia pozwala zakwestionować te opinie. Artykuł podnosi te zagad-
nienia wykorzystując dane liczbowe i informacje z różnych źródeł, rozważając także bezkrytyczne 
poparcie głownonurtowych mediów i kół politycznych dla organizacji imprezy, jak również brak 
krytycznej refleksji kręgów akademickich nt. realnych kosztów imprezy. 
Słowa kluczowe: Wielkie Imprezy Sportowe, Euro 2012, polska polityka i gospodarka, piłka 
nożna, prawa człowieka. 
